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On 16 September 2016, the World Health Organization 
confirmed a Rift Valley fever (RVF) outbreak in Niger. 
Epidemiological surveillance was reinforced among 
the French Armed Forces deployed in Niger and bor-
dering countries: Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. On 26 
October, a probable case of RVF was reported in a ser-
vice member sampled in Mali 3 weeks earlier. At the 
time the result was reported, the patient was on vaca-
tion on Martinique. An epidemiological investigation 
was conducted to confirm this case and identify other 
cases. Finally, the case was not confirmed, but three 
suspected cases of RVF were confirmed using serolog-
ical and molecular testing. RVF viral RNA was detect-
able in whole blood for 57 and 67 days after onset of 
symptoms for two cases, although it was absent from 
plasma and serum. At the time of diagnosis, these 
cases had already returned from Mali to Europe. The 
infectivity of other arboviruses in whole blood has 
already been highlighted. That RVF virus has been 
detected in whole blood that long after the onset of 
symptoms (67 days) raises the question of its potential 
prolonged infectivity. Because of exposure to tropical 
infectious diseases during deployment, military popu-
lations could import emerging pathogens to Europe.
Background
Rift Valley fever (RVF) is an arbovirosis affecting both 
domestic and wild ruminants, especially sheep, cat-
tle and goats, as well as humans (zoonosis) [1]. RVF 
is caused by a mosquito-borne virus of the family 
Phenuiviridae and genus Phlebovirus. Its impact can 
be considerable, with large outbreaks reported in the 
past: 200,000 human cases and 600 deaths in Egypt 
in 1976, and 230 deaths among 747 human cases 
in Sudan in 2007 and 2008 [2,3]. RVF virus (RVFV) is 
widespread in Africa, with spillover to the Comoros 
Archipelago (including Mayotte), Madagascar, Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen. So far, Europe has been free from 
active viral circulation. However, competent vectors 
have been identified in several European countries and 
RVFV introduction is a real concern [4].
Humans are mainly infected by contact with body flu-
ids and tissues of infected animals (live or dead); 
dietary exposure is also suspected (e.g. raw or unpas-
teurised milk). They can also be infected by mosquito 
bites. Mosquitoes of the genus  Aedes  and  Culex  are 
considered to be the most competent vectors to trans-
mit RVFV. The primary foci of RVF epidemics are mainly 
triggered by heavy rainfall episodes, when vectors 
are abundant [4-6]. RVF infection in humans is gener-
ally asymptomatic [7]. Symptomatic forms are mostly 
benign (dengue-like illness), occur after a 2–6-day 
incubation period and last less than a week [8,9]. 
However, severe forms may be observed, with compli-
cations such as encephalitis (up to 5% of cases, up to 
60 days after the onset of symptoms), haemorrhagic 
fever (less than 1%) or retinitis (up to 20%) [10-12]. 
Viraemia of RVFV spans the acute febrile phase of the 
disease, i.e. 3 or 4 days [7].
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The French Armed Forces (FAF) have been deployed 
in Africa’s Sahel region, including Niger, Mali, Chad 
and Burkina Faso, since 2014. Considering the risk of 
arboviral infections during such deployment, unex-
plained fever and dengue-like syndrome have been 
under mandatory epidemiological surveillance in the 
FAF since 2004. In addition, since January 2016, dried 
blood spot samples have been routinely collected on 
blotting paper for any service member presenting an 
undiagnosed fever. Collected samples are sent to the 
French National Reference Centre (CNR) for Arboviruses 
in Marseille, France, for serological testing and viral 
RNA detection.
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Travel from Mali and stays in other countries of suspected, probable and confirmed Rift Valley fever cases, French Armed 
Forces, Mali, 2016–2017 (n = 6)
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Outbreak detection
On 16 September 2016, the World Health Organization 
confirmed an RVF epidemic on the Western Niger bor-
der with Mali, in the Tahoua region [13]. The outbreak 
occurred in the population of transhumant livestock 
farmers, with 399 human cases and 33 reported deaths 
[14]. An epizootic RVF outbreak was also reported 
among livestock during the same period [13].
This worrisome RVF epidemic in Niger led the French 
Military Health Service to enhance RVF prevention 
starting on 23 September 2016. Information about the 
disease was communicated to field military medical 
staff and service members. Contact with local animals 
and consumption of local animal products were strictly 
forbidden. A reminder of the epidemiological and 
microbiological surveillance procedures was given.
On 26 October 2016, the CNR for Arboviruses reported 
to the French Armed Forces Centre for Epidemiology 
and Public Health (CESPA) in Marseille the detection 
of RVFV RNA in one blotting paper blood sample using 
reverse transcription-PCR (RT-PCR) [15]. The patient 
was a French service member deployed from June to 
October 2016 in a small village called Abeïbara, in the 
Kidal region in north-eastern Mali. Three weeks before 
the alert, on 6 October, during a short stay in Gao, Mali, 
he had presented a dengue-like illness that lasted 48 
hours, without complications. A blood sample was 
taken on blotting paper on 7 October. He returned 
to France on 14 October after a 3-day stay on Crete, 
Greece, and went on leave on Martinique, French West 
Indies, on 22 October. By the time the alert was issued, 
most of the service members deployed in Abeïbara had 
returned to France and were on leave.
We report here the epidemiological and biologi-
cal investigations conducted in order to confirm the 
described case, search for additional suspected cases 
and identify the RVFV exposure factors.
Table 1
Timeline of confirmed Rift Valley fever cases after exposure in Mali, French Armed Forces, 2016–2017 (n = 3)
Case 1 Case 2 Case 5
Exposure during incubation period
Location Abeïbara Abeïbara Gao
Contact with ruminants
Direct/touching −  + −
Indirect/proximity  +  + −
Mosquito bites > 10 bites/day 1–2 bites/day Not observed
Acute symptoms
Fever > 38.5 °C  +  +  +
Headache  +  +  +
Retro-orbital pain  + −  +
Photophobia  + −  +
Myalgia  +  +  +
Arthralgia −  +  +
Diarrhoea − −  +
Date of onset 12 Sep 2016 13 Sep 2016 05 Oct 2016
Location Abeïbara Abeïbara Gao
Duration 3 days 10 days 2 days
Locations after febrile stage Crete, France, Ukraine Crete, South of France Mali
RVFV serology
Sample date 18 Nov 2016 03 Nov 2016 22 Mar 2017
Results IgM- and IgG-positive IgM- and IgG-positive IgM- and IgG-positive
RT-PCR
Whole blood Positive Positive NA
Day after onset 67 days 57 days NA
Plasma Negative Negative Negative
Semen Negative Negative NA
Viral sequence 683 nt 683 nt NA
Culture Negative Negative NA
NA: not available; RVFV: Rift Valley fever virus.
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Methods
Epidemiological investigations
Probable case confirmation
Laboratory diagnosis confirmation of the initial 
reported case was the first step of the investigation, 
as the alert relied on a single RT-PCR assay performed 
on a dried blood sample. The patient was defined as a 
probable case. Considering that RVFV RNA has previ-
ously been detected up to 20 days after onset of ill-
ness in whole blood and up to 4 months after onset 
in semen [16,17], the patient, who was on leave in the 
French West Indies (Martinique) 20 days after onset of 
illness, was presumed to still be viraemic. The probabil-
ity of RVFV being imported to Martinique, where com-
petent vectors are abundantly present, was considered 
non-negligible. Therefore, the patient was urgently 
addressed to a local military health centre for clinical 
evaluation. Individual protection measures against 
mosquito bites were implemented. Blood samples were 
taken and sent to continental France for analysis.
A confirmed case was defined as a patient who had 
laboratory confirmation of a recent RVF infection.
Case finding
The second step was to identify suspected cases. They 
were defined as any French service member present-
ing fever ≥ 38.5 °C (the threshold defined for fever in 
the FAF Epidemiological surveillance system, consid-
ering hot climate in tropical areas and physical activi-
ties during deployment), associated with headache 
or retro-orbital pains or arthralgia or myalgia or rash, 
between 1 September and 15 October 2016 in Mali. 
An extended search of suspected cases was initiated 
using data from various sources: epidemiological sur-
veillance data focusing on dengue-like syndrome and 
unexplained fever, samples received by the CNR for 
Arboviruses, and the list of patients seen for fever pro-
vided by military medical staff deployed in Mali. For 
each suspected case, a medical doctor administered 
a face-to-face questionnaire and a venous blood sam-
ple was collected. The questionnaire included items 
about health events and exposure to RVF during mili-
tary deployment and more precisely during the 10 days 
(enlarged incubation period) preceding any symptoms 
that could be related to RVF (isolated fever or dengue-
like syndrome) (Supplement).
Cross-sectional study
The purpose of the third and last step was to identify 
cases of RVF who did not seek medical care and/or 
cases of asymptomatic RVF infection, and to estimate 
exposures to known RVF risk factors. A cross-sectional 
study was conducted among the 187 service members 
of the military contingent deployed in Abeïbara. This 
investigation took place in France on 16–17 November 
2016, after the return of military units. The inclusion 
criterion was being a member of the contingent who 
was present in Abeïbara during September or October 
2016 (end of the deployment of this contingent in Mali). 
For each subject included, the same anonymous ques-
tionnaire used for suspected cases was self-adminis-
tered during a collective meeting, and whole blood and 
plasma were collected for viral diagnosis.
Microbiological investigations
All the microbiological investigations were performed 
by the French CNR for Arboviruses in Marseille, France. 
The criterion for a laboratory confirmation of a recent 
RVF infection was the detection of RVF RNA in any 
specimen and/or presence of RVFV IgM antibodies. 
Serological investigations were performed using MAC-
ELISA as previously described [18] and indirect ELISA for 
IgG detection. Plasma from suspected cases and from 
subjects included in the cross-sectional survey were 
analysed with the following IgG/IgM serological tests: 
Table 2
Seroprevalence of arboviruses, symptoms and exposure to 
Rift Valley fever virus reported by the military contingent 
deployed in Abeïbara, Mali, in September and October 
2016, French Armed Forces (n = 99)
Participant characteristics n %
Reported symptoms
Feeling feverish 15 15.2
Headache 29 29.3
Retro-orbital pain 6 6.1
Vision disorders 3 3.0
Arthralgia 16 16.2
Myalgia 21 21.2
Diarrhoea 18 18.2
Retrospectively classified as suspected casesa 14 14.2
Seeking care for fever 12 12.2
Positive arbovirus serology
IgM RVFV 0 0.0
IgG RVFV 1 1.0
IgM Flavivirus (dengue, WNV, ZKV 0 0.0
IgG Flavivirus (dengue, WNV, ZKV) 26 26.3
IgM Alphavirus (CHIKV) 0 0.0
IgG Alphavirus (CHIKV) 20 20.2
Exposure to RVFV
Direct contact with ruminantsb 35 35.4
Contact with dead ruminantsb 20 20.2
Participation in the slaughter of a goat 28 28.3
Cleaning or sleeping in a room where animals were 
kept 47 47.5
Care of a wounded person 6 6.1
Consumption of raw milk 3 3.0
Mosquito bites 84 84.8
CHIKV: chikungunya virus; RVFV: Rift Valley fever virus; WNV: West 
Nile virus; ZKV: Zika virus.
a According to the definition of suspected cases: French service 
member who presented fever > 38.5 °C associated with headache 
or retro-orbital pains or arthralgia or myalgia or rash between 1 
September and 15 October 2016.
b The implicated ruminants were goats, zebu cattle and, in rare 
cases, camels.
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RVFV, dengue virus (DENV), West Nile virus (WNV), 
Zika virus (ZIKV) and chikungunya virus (CHIKV).
We screened for RVFV RNA in plasma, whole blood 
and semen when available, by RT-PCR using two dif-
ferent TaqMan assays targeting distinct viral genome 
sequences [15,19]. Sequencing and viral isolation on 
Vero and C6/36 cell lines were attempted for all PCR-
positive blood samples.
Ethical statement
All participants of the cross-sectional study were vol-
unteers and received information about the study 
and the disease. Each confirmed case received care 
adapted to their state of health provided by the French 
military health service. Informed and signed consent 
for the use of their data were obtained from each con-
firmed case. Considering the possibility of late compli-
cations for RVF (encephalitis) cases and according to 
French regulation in case of an outbreak with immedi-
ate public health threat (RVFV importation), no ethical 
approval was required.
Results
Probable case investigation
On 28 October, 2 days after the alert, the probable 
case was examined at a French military health centre 
on Martinique and was asymptomatic. In the interview, 
he did not recall any contact with live or dead animals 
but mentioned nocturnal mosquito bites. Temporary 
individual protection measures against mosquito 
bites were implemented during his stay in Martinique. 
Another blood sample collected one week later was 
PCR-negative as well as IgM- and IgG-negative for RVFV, 
therefore invalidating the case. The false positivity of 
this case can be attributed to a lack of PCR specific-
ity carried out on a dried blood sample [15]. A second 
RT-PCR assay targeting a distinct RVFV sequence [19] 
was retrospectively performed on the first blotting 
paper and was negative. This RT-PCR was then imple-
mented in the CNR laboratory in a systematic way.
According to the patient, several other military person-
nel of the Abeïbara contingent had presented fever and 
myalgia during the same period in Mali. A search of sus-
pected cases was conducted based on his statements.
Investigation of suspected cases
No case of unexplained fever or dengue-like syndrome 
had been reported to the epidemiological surveillance 
by the FAF in Mali from September to early October 
2016 (end of mission for the Abeïbara contingent). 
Active research identified six suspected RVF cases in 
Mali from September to October 2016. At the time of 
the alert, one was still deployed in Mali and five had 
completed their mission and returned to France after a 
3-day stay in Crete, Greece. Of the latter, two stayed in 
France, and the three others were on leave in Ukraine, 
Ireland and Nepal (Figure). Finally, three of the six 
suspected cases were confirmed as RVF cases several 
weeks after the onset of symptoms (Figure).
Biological and clinical features of the 
confirmed cases
The first confirmed case (Case 1,  Figure  and  Table 1) 
was a 28-year-old man, deployed in Mali from June to 
early October 2016. During the RVF incubation period, 
he stayed in Abeïbara, had several direct contacts with 
live ruminants (camels and goats), consumed goat 
meat purchased from a livestock farmer, and reported 
between one to two mosquito bites per day. On 12 
September, he presented fever (> 39 °C), headache 
with retro-orbital pain, myalgia, and photophobia. The 
symptoms resolved within 24–48 hours, without com-
plications. The patient left Mali 24 days after the onset 
of symptoms, spent 3 days in Crete, several days in 
the south of France, then several weeks in Ukraine and 
returned to France in mid-November. On his return, he 
was hospitalised due to the persistence of intermittent 
headaches with photophobia. Meningoencephalitis 
was excluded in normal clinical examinations, cer-
ebral magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) with no sig-
nal abnormality and cerebrospinal fluid parameters. 
Ophthalmological examinations revealed normal visual 
acuity and two old peripheral lesions from a chori-
oretinal focus to the right eye, without any evolution 3 
months later. Laboratory testing revealed the presence 
of IgM and IgG against RVFV. RT-PCRs were negative in 
serum, plasma and semen at 67 days after the onset 
of symptoms, but viral RNA was still detected in whole 
blood, which was confirmed by partial viral sequenc-
ing (derived 683 nt sequence GenBank: BankIt2148117 
RVF41318 MH880842). It was not possible to obtain a 
larger sequence of viral RNA. In addition, viral isolation 
attempts on VERO and C6/36 cell lines remained unsuc-
cessful. The patient also had positive Toxoplasma gon-
diiserology (IgG without IgM), which may explain the 
chorioretinal scars.
The second case (Case 2, Figure, Table 1) was a 38-year-
old man. He was deployed in Mali from June to the end 
of September 2016. During the incubation period, he 
stayed in Abeïbara and reported proximity with goats 
and camels without direct contact and more than 10 
mosquito bites per day, occurring night and day. On 13 
September, he presented fever (> 39 °C) associated with 
headache, myalgia and arthralgia. He was hospitalised 
for 4 days and received symptomatic treatment. The 
symptoms lasted 10 days, without complications. He 
left Mali 15 days after the onset of symptoms, spent 3 
days in Crete and stayed in the south of France. Normal 
clinical examination, including ophthalmological exam-
ination, was reported on 2 November 2016. Semen and 
blood samples were collected 57 days after the onset 
of symptoms (9 November). Plasma was positive for 
anti-RVFV IgM and IgG, PCRs were negative in semen 
and plasma, while viral RNA was still detected in whole 
blood as was confirmed by partial viral sequencing. 
The derived 683 nt sequence (GenBank BankIt2148117 
RVF41125 MH880841) differed by only 1 nt from the 
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sequence obtained from Case 1. As for Case 1, viral 
isolation attempts remained unsuccessful.
The third case (Case 5, Figure, Table 1) was a 54 years-
old man. He was deployed in Mali from August to 
December 2016 and returned to France in January 2017. 
During the incubation period, he stayed in Gao, had no 
contact with ruminants and did not report mosquito 
bites. On 5 October, he presented fever (> 39 °C), head-
ache, photophobia, arthralgia and myalgia for 2 days. 
Two dried blood samples on blotting papers were col-
lected during the symptomatic phase. Serologic tests 
and RT-PCR were negative for the first sample and 
insufficient blood quantity led to uninterpretable lab-
oratory results for the second sample. A late sample 
collected in March 2017 was positive for anti-RVFV IgM 
and IgG, but PCRs remained negative. The patient also 
complained of long-lasting headaches with normal cer-
ebral and ophthalmological investigations.
Cases 1 and 2 were kept under personal anti-vector pro-
tective measures and were excluded from blood dona-
tion until clearance of their viraemia, 100 days after the 
onset of symptoms.
Cross-sectional study
Of the 187 service members, 99 (53%) were included in 
the cross-sectional study. Fifteen participants reported 
a fever episode that had led 12 of them to seek medi-
cal care (Table 2). None of these fever cases was 
reported to the epidemiological surveillance system. 
Retrospectively, 14 could be considered suspected RVF 
cases. Among those, six reported being symptomatic 
between 7 and 15 October, suggesting grouped cases. 
No other recent arbovirus infections were observed 
(absence of specific IgM) (Table 2). Only one partici-
pant, who did not report any symptoms, had a posi-
tive RVFV IgG result, suggesting a previous exposure to 
the virus. In addition, 26 participants revealed a previ-
ous exposure to a flavivirus (dengue virus or/and WNV 
or/and ZKV) and 20 to an alphavirus (CHIKV). Among 
these subjects, three were positive for both alphavirus 
and flavivirus IgG and one for both flavivirus and RVFV 
IgG.
Among the included subjects, 39% encountered goats, 
zebu cattle and donkeys inside the military camp, 35% 
had direct contact with live animals, and 20% declared 
they had touched or handled dead animals (mostly 
goats and zebu cattle), while 28% had participated in 
animal slaughter (mostly goats or zebu cattle). Three 
service members reported the consumption of raw 
goat or camel milk. In addition, 85% reported mos-
quito bites, of whom 17% declared more than five bites 
per day. Bites were predominantly nocturnal in 81% 
of cases, but could also occur during the day. During 
September and October 2016, most of the interviewed 
service members (72%) consumed local meat, mainly 
zebu and goat meat.
Control measures
Contact with local animals and consumption of local 
animal products were strictly forbidden for French ser-
vice members. Individual protection measures against 
mosquito bites were reinforced. No other cases of 
RVF have been reported since this outbreak in the FAF 
deployed in Mali.
Discussion
Rift Valley fever in Mali
RVF virus has probably been circulating in Mali for a 
very long time [20]. Sporadic human cases have been 
observed [17,21]. A recent serological study conducted 
among cattle in Mali revealed RVFV circulation among 
ruminants, with a seropositivity prevalence for RVF of 
10.0% among bovines in Kidal and 15.8% in Gao [22]. 
In March 2017, considering the RVF outbreak in Niger 
and the transhumance patterns of livestock farmers, 
experts from the Food and Agriculture Organisation of 
the United Nations took the view that RVF was likely/
very likely (a 66–99% chance range) to occur in Mali 
during the vector season [23]. In our study, we con-
firmed three human cases of RVF in French service 
members who occurred in Mali at the end of the rainy 
season in 2016. No sequelae were observed except 
persistent headaches for months in two of them. These 
findings were made by chance, thanks to a non-con-
firmed false-positive test.
The small number of confirmed cases in our study did 
not allow us to identify risk factors for RVF through 
statistical analyses. In addition, face-to-face question-
naires may have introduced a bias in the responses on 
risky behaviours service members did not admit to. 
The case in Gao (Case 3) was probably infected by a 
mosquito bite. The other two cases were exposed in 
Abeïbara, an isolated location between the city of Kidal 
and the border with Algeria with a hot desert climate 
and less than 50 mm of rainfall per year. The presence 
of wells in the village allows the local population to 
raise ruminants (mainly goats, zebu cattle and camels). 
Moderate rainfall from mid-July to mid-August probably 
promoted the emergence of  Aedes  mosquitoes, which 
explains the widespread exposure to mosquito bites 
reported by service members in our study [24]. RVFV 
exposure for Cases 1 and 2 could be linked to direct 
contact with ruminants, particularly during the slaugh-
ter of infected goats, or to mosquito bites.
Because of insecure conditions and repeated attacks 
around the military camp, entomological investiga-
tions and biological analyses on local livestock could 
not be performed. Regarding RVF in West Africa, this 
local transmission in a desert area may be the result 
of either the introduction of sick animals by nomadic 
herders or transovarian transmission of the virus in 
some mosquito species, such as Aedes vexans, whose 
infected eggs survive desiccation during the dry sea-
son and hatch infected imagos when temporary ponds 
are flooded by rainfall [25,26].
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Service members: travellers exposed to a 
specific infectious risk
During field operations, service members are deployed 
in rural, remote, and non-tourist areas, close to the 
local populations they need to protect, and are there-
fore exposed to the same health risks. Scarcity of 
water resources in the Sahel desert explains the prox-
imity of service members to ruminants because both 
use the same water sources (35% had direct contact 
with ruminants) and the increased risk of exposure to 
zoonoses. The large proportion (28%) of service mem-
bers involved in the slaughter of goats was more sur-
prising. Although slaughter and consumption of local 
meat is forbidden in the FAF, it has been observed in 
isolated military units with strong logistic constraints 
[27]. In addition, slaughtering occurred before the 
implementation of RVF preventive measures and the 
risk of RVFV exposure could have been underestimated 
at that time. Exposure to vector-borne diseases, espe-
cially arboviroses, appears to be high in the military 
population. Among the subjects included in the cross-
sectional study, 20% and 26% presented serological 
evidence of exposure to, respectively, alphaviruses 
and flaviviruses. In addition, 84% reported mosquito 
bites during deployment in Abeïbara. Even if vector 
control measures are acknowledged and enforced by 
service members, extreme climatic conditions in the 
field (temperature > 40 °C) and around-the-clock camp 
watches may be obstacles to a total adherence to 
those measures, thus increasing the risk of exposure 
[27]. Military units are also a mobile population. At the 
end of their mission, they tend to go on leave abroad, 
including in countries that are home to competent vec-
tors, leading to a risk of importing arboviruses [4]. In 
its risk assessment published in October 2016, the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) concluded that the RVF outbreak in Niger* did 
not pose a new risk to the European Union [28]. One of 
their conclusive points was that rural areas should not 
be considered tourist areas and were unlikely to be vis-
ited by ordinary travellers. Considering that more than 
10,000 service members from 50 countries, including 
19 European countries, are deployed in Mali and neigh-
bouring countries, we recommend that future assess-
ments take account of the specific risk presented by 
deployed European service members [29].
Risk of Rift Valley fever virus importation to 
Europe by travellers
In this study, we illustrate, based on real cases, how 
RVFV could spread from an endemic area to RVF-free 
areas. Golnar et al. recently underlined that the high-
est risk of importing RVFV into the United States 
was associated with infected humans travelling by 
plane, a risk that could be similar for Europe [30]. 
International air travel was also implicated in the 
spread of CHIKV and ZIKV, leading to emerging global 
health issues. Two of the RVF cases described here 
were confirmed after their stay in Mali and had trav-
elled, several days after the febrile stage, through-
out areas in Europe (Greece, France, Ireland, Ukraine) 
where competent vectors are present, especially Aedes 
albopictus,  Ae. vexans  and  Culex pipiens  [4,31]. In the 
2006 to 2007outbreak of RVF in Kenya, Njenga et al. 
estimated RVFV viraemia at 101.3–107.8  TCID50  per mL 
(i.e. 101.1–107.6  plaque-forming units (PFU)/mL) [32,33]. 
Experimental studies to infect mosquitoes and estimate 
vector competence exposed mosquitoes to a viraemia 
threshold > 104.7PFU/mL [33]. Considering these differ-
ent points, the risk of RVFV importation to Europe by 
travellers should be considered as significant.
To our knowledge, this is the first time that the RVFV 
has been detected in whole blood so long after the 
onset of symptoms (67 days). In our investigation, RVF 
RNA was detected in whole blood up to 67 days after 
the onset of symptoms, but not in serum or plasma. 
This suggests RVFV RNA compartmentalisation in red 
blood cells, as already observed for WNV and ZIKV [34-
37]. This finding enlarges the window for the use of 
molecular tools for RVF diagnosis, but it also raises the 
question of the duration of human viraemia and infec-
tiousness. The maximal extent of human infectious-
ness for RVFV is unknown and because attempts of 
viral isolation on cell cultures remained unsuccessful, 
the infectivity of the virus could not be confirmed in 
our study. However, hosts with low viraemia could also 
infect vectors and play a role in the spread of arbovi-
ruses [38]. The question remains whether our patients 
were still infectious when they returned to Europe.
Conclusion
Our article reports a cluster of human cases of RVF in 
Mali. Despite an efficient active search that confirmed 
two of four suspected cases, the alert was issued too 
late to avoid the risk of RVFV being spread. The con-
firmed cases had already returned from Mali to Europe. 
Persistence of detection of RVFV in whole blood until 
67 days from symptom onset raises the question of 
its potential prolonged infectivity. Further studies are 
needed to explore the duration of human infectious-
ness and the relevance of PCR on whole blood. As a 
specific population of travellers, service members 
should be included in future risk assessments by inter-
national and European organisations.
*Erratum
In the original publication, the sentence referring to the RVF 
outbreak in Niger erroneously referred to Nigeria. This was 
corrected on 25 February 2019. We apologise for the mistake.
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